his essay is about the Ottoman treatment of war prisoners at the end of the eighteenth century. It questions the common assumption of Ottoman fanaticism and ignorance of European military norms in the treatment of captives. Pouqueville's memoirs of captivity played a crucial role in the emergence of this view, but a comparison of his testimony and Ottoman documents shows that there is a discrepancy between the two accounts. While there were many diferences in practice, the Ottomans shared a legalistic view of the treatment of war prisoners, based on the concept of reciprocity.
numerous French prisoners in Istanbul. How to deal with so many 'prisoners of war' -to use a modern appellation -was a major problem for the Ottomans.
Contemporary western observers condemned the Ottoman treatment of French prisoners in this war with François Pouqueville (1770-1838) no doubt leaving the most vivid account on the subject. 2 Published in 1805, his captivity memoirs were very inluential in the shaping of unfavourable views about the Ottomans. Pouqueville's memoirs created a sort of 'Midnight-Expressefect', causing much sensation in Europe. With the exception of Baron François de Tott, 3 he was the most acclaimed and acute 'Islam analyst' of the pre-CNN world (so to say) enjoying popularity for his strong feelings and views about his subject matter: the Ottomans. he authority of this polymath -the diplomat, the writer, the explorer, the physician and the historian -has remained largely unquestioned 4 especially when he wrote on an obscure topic such as captivity in the Ottoman lands in late eighteenth century. 5 his was all the more so since he was, alas, the captive himself. Close analyses of the canonical views of certain renowned European intellectuals such as Paul Rycaut and Baron de Tott have proved to be fruitful in understanding the mindset of the authors as well as the contemporary Ottomans. 6 hese studies have shown us that even after many centuries, University of Wisconsin, 1965) ; for the diplomatic sphere consult Saul, Norman, Russia and the Mediterranean 1797-1807 (he University of Chicago Press, 1970) Tartares, Amsterdam, 1784] . 4 Irritated by his accusations of British maltreatment of the French prisoners, the British hornton was one of the rare contemporaries to question Pouqueville's intentions by drawing attention to several logical contradictions in his memoirs. He, in turn, accused Pouqueville of perpetuating the enmity between the British and the French "by the basest calumnies" targeting the British, see hornton, T., he Present State of Turkey … 2 vols. (London, 1809), pp. xiii-xxiv. 5 One of the few sources we should note is the famous Bulgarian priest Sofroni's account, see Akbayar, Nuri (ed.), Vraça'lı Sofroni, Osmanlı'da Bir Papaz. Günahkar Sofroni'nin Çileli Hayat Hikayesi, 1739 -1813 , trans. Aziz Nazmi Şakir-Taş (İstanbul: Kitapevi, 2003 ; for a list of the captives held in the Imperial Dockyards in 1740 (register du bagne de Constantinople) see Marmara, Rinaldo, İstanbul Deniz Zindanı 1740 (İstanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 2005 . 6 See for instance, Darling, Linda, "Ottoman politics through British eyes: Paul Rycaut's he Present State of the Ottoman Empire", he Journal of World History, 5 (1994) , Aksan,  anecdotal and misleading stories about the Ottomans from such eyewitness accounts still occupy a prominent place in popular works. Stereotypes based on these imaginative renderings of the Ottomans are unavoidable in the absence of studies, based on archival research. 7 Nevertheless, no comparable study exists for Pouqueville. Neither does there exist a solid secondary literature in Ottoman studies such as to permit us to attempt a comprehensive analysis of the interplay of 'Pouqueville the intellectual' and 'Pouqueville the captive' in his memoirs. his may leave us with the unwarranted choice of mobilizing the 'anti-Orientalism discourse' as the most convenient unit of analysis. 8 Nevertheless, this essay by no means has the aim of vilifying Pouqueville's valuable account on such shaky grounds. It, rather, contends that one has to use European eyewitness accounts on the Ottomans with scepticism and only when corroborated by authentic evidence. hus, this article follows the outmoded and painstaking methodology of the historian's craft: (1) juxtaposing Pouqueville's testimony with Ottoman documents that have hitherto been virtually unutilized; (2) highlighting the convergences and divergences of the alternative narratives; and (3) drawing a preliminary conclusion based on the emerging picture.
While Pouqueville's condemnation of the Ottoman ill-treatment of French prisoners was not totally unfounded, part of his observations were related to Ali Paşa of Janina's war on the Suliotes -the unruly inhabitants of the mountains lying along the Dalmatian coast. Russians' exploitation of the popular theme of 'oriental despotism' in the contest with their Ottoman ally over the 'ownership' of the French troops captured in the Ionian Islands was also important in the creation of a despicable Ottoman image.
A review of the event and Pouqueville's arguments are in order. After the French invasion of Egypt the Ottomans had to ight the French on two separate fronts, namely, Egypt and the Adriatic. he Ottomans and Russians decided to send a combined leet to the Adriatic in order to expel the French from the Ionian Islands. he expedition ended with the occupation of Virginia H., "Breaking the spell of Baron de Tott reframing the question of military reform in the Ottoman empire, 1760 -1830 ", he International History Review, 24/2 (2002 Aksan, "Breaking the spell of Baron de Tott", pp. 113, 120; one may count Goodwin, Godfrey, he Janissaries (London: Saqi Books, 2006) Pouqueville's observations on captivity were based on three separate events. hese are (I) the forced march of the French garrison of Zante to Istanbul in chains; (II) the story of eleven French oicers including the author who were captured by corsairs in a ship that had left Alexandria for France; and (III) the transfer of many French captives from Istanbul to several provincial fortresses. Pouqueville's arguments can be summed up in four points: (1) hat the Russians should have refused to deliver the French prisoners to the barbarous Turks because both Russia and France were civilized nations whereas the Ottomans were not. (2) hat the Ottomans did not make a distinction between a war prisoner and a criminal; they, rather, simply chained the French captives in pairs like brigands and forced them walk all the way to Istanbul on foot. (3) hat the Ottomans ignored the military hierarchy by imprisoning the rank-and-ile and their oicers in the same cells. (4) hat any favourable treatment of the French prisoners by the Ottoman authorities should be viewed as an isolated case, not so much a state policy as a noble act of a benevolent paşa. In short, Pouqueville argued that the fanatical Ottomans had an inveterate hatred for the French because of the Egyptian expedition and made the French prisoners the scapegoats for it.
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Actually the Russians shared with Pouqueville some concerns about Ottoman norms of conducting warfare and prisoner treatment. Such concerns were based on religious prejudices and the perceived Ottoman ignorance of the European norms of warfare. However, Napoleon's treatment of the Muslims in Egypt was quite the same. his included post-mortem decapitation on the battleield and terrorizing the civilians by rolling out the severed heads from sacks before the assembled Cairenes. pp.197-200, 212-13, 218-19, 224. Ottomans' point of view, the French invasion of Egypt was tantamount to brigandage due to the absence of a declaration of war. As this was an unprecedented act of violation of international law, the Ottomans claimed, they did not have to treat the French prisoners any better than brigands. As a matter of fact, the kadı of Malkara referred to the prisoners as "haydut" in his oicial report.
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his attitude was by no means peculiar to the Ottomans. It was very common especially among British naval oicers to label French captives as brigands during the Napoleonic wars. which reveals that retaliation and coniscation were not instinctive but spiteful instruments of a calculated policy. 16 A major contribution to the Russian doubts about the Ottoman ally was the maltreatment of the French soldiers by the irregular troops of Ali Paşa of Janina. After occupying the Dalmatian towns of Butrinto, Parga, Prevesa and Vonitsa, he treated the overwhelmed French garrison of Prevesa together with the Prevesans with cruelty, following the conventional Ottoman norms, for they had refused to submit peacefully to his authority before the inal assault. In the inal analysis though, the undisciplined and irregular nature of the 'Albanian' troops on the one hand and his personal revanchist attitude on the other hand seem to have been the principal factors in the maltreatment of the French troops and the civilians. On one occasion during the siege of Corfu, Russian soldiers saved leeing French soldiers from slaughter at the hands of Ali Paşa's mixed force of Muslim and Christian Albanians by inviting them into their own ranks. his was a suicient excuse for the Russian Admiral Ushakov to show reluctance to share the French captives with the Ottomans in violation of the agreement.
17
he Ottoman empire was a patchwork comprised of central authority and self-appointed provincial notables, of the army under central authority and the irregular troops or the 'frontier raiders' of the late eighteenth century. A close scrutiny of particular events shows that Ottoman patterns were not much diferent from European patterns so far as the Ottoman central authority, the Sublime Porte, is concerned. For instance, the Sublime Porte encouraged the Ottoman forces to ofer safe conduct to the French garrison in Corfu to bring the siege to a successful conclusion. herefore, after the surrender of the French garrison, the Ottomans undertook the transportation of 2,300 French soldiers from Corfu to Toulon and Ancona on ten merchant ships hired by the monies borrowed from Ionian merchants with a freight cost of 24,055 real (78,178.5 guruş 30 para). 
Casualty rates during the march
One of the reasons for the condemnation of the Ottoman treatment of prisoners was the forced march of captives in chains to Istanbul. hose who did not survive the long march were decapitated post-mortem. his practice was certainly one of the points in which the Ottoman patterns of prisoner treatment diverged from the European pattern. However, neither the forced march nor the collection of heads has to imply the perpetration of arbitrary violence. he provincial kadıs -the Ottoman judges with certain administrative responsibilities -were responsible for inspecting the march and keeping the Sublime Porte informed on a regular basis. heir reports give much needed information on relevant Ottoman regulations concerning the captives in addition to ofering us a glimpse into the details of their forced marches. For instance, the Ottomans captured 195 French soldiers along with a woman in the island of Cephalonia. Ahmed Paşa, the commander of İnebahtı (Lepanto), sent these captives to Istanbul with his başçuhadar, Bekir. Each Ottoman sub-province (kaza) provided cebelu soldiers to escort the group as it marched across the respective kaza. he march seems to have lasted roughly 1.5 months (mid-November -January) and followed the route of Gümülcine -MekriFerecik (?) -İpsala -Keşan -Malkara -İnecik -Rodosçuk (Tekirdağ?) -Çorlu -Silivri, terminating in Istanbul as suggested by a series of kadı reports. his is comparable to Pouqueville's igure of 52 days cited for the forced march of the Zante garrison to Istanbul.
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Relying on the oicial reports, the journey must have been arduous and hazardous. hey arrived in Silivri, the outskirts of Istanbul, with 31 casualties that corresponded to a casualty rate of roughly 20 per cent. his group entered Istanbul on 1 January 1799. 20 he report of the kadı of Gümülcine indicates that the march progressed smoothly, sufering no casualties until after leaving the town in early December. hey left the town for Mekri the next day but then had to return because of bandits on the way. When the journey was resumed on the second day, one of them died of natural causes ("hulul-i eceliyle mürd") and his severed head was sent along with an inspector (mübaşir) to Istanbul. 188 men and one woman entered the town of Keşan. hree more 19 Pouqueville, Travels through the Morea, p. 138. 20 "Ertesi yirmidördüncü salı günü Kasr-i Alayı teşrif ve Kefalonya ceziresinden çıkarılıb donanma tarafından İnebahtı'ya andan Asitane'ye gelan Fransız esirleri Babıaliyye geldiğini seyr ü temaşa buyurub Topkapu'ya avdet ve istirahat buyuruldu", Arıkan, Sema (ed.), III. Selim'in Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi Tarafından Tutulan Ruzname (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1993), p. 295. men died on the road to İnecik with casualty rates surmounting as the march progressed. he death of 19 more men in İnecik suggests a possible outbreak of epidemic in the group. By the time they halted at Çorlu, the group was reduced to 166 men and the woman with the accompanying 31 severed heads.
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Chopping of the corpses' heads is quite appalling for the modern observer just as much as it was for the contemporaries. One might collect the heads of the enemy corpses on the battleield -the site of violence -in the hopes of material reward, as revealed in countless Ottoman narrative sources. However, in the present case, the motivation was not inancial; it was, rather a bureaucratic nuisance to prove that the captive neither ran away nor sufered an unauthorized execution during the march. He, rather, died of "natural causes" if we are to ignore war-related factors such as epidemics, famine and fatigue. In this sense, sending the severed heads in sacks to Istanbul was a cruder version of the collection of identity discs or army tags for the purpose of identiication of the corpse -i.e., the corpse of the "accursed" enemy in our case, and not that of the martyr. he procedure is quite diferent should the prisoner die in the Tersane Dungeon. A rare case from the year 1764 reveals that the corpse of a Spanish prisoner was examined in the presence of a group of witnesses including among others the Steward (emin) of the Tersane and the deputy kadı of Kasımpaşa. he examination established that he had died of natural causes which required the omission of his name from the registers.
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While the casualty rates in this particular march described above is a bit high, this was not always the case. For instance, Kapudane Abdülkadir Bey mentioned the capture of 500 French prisoners in the island of Santa Maura. he oicial diary (ruzname) of Selim III cites the same igure for this group of captives when it records their arrival in Istanbul on 6 January 1799 -ive days later than the group mentioned above. 23 A.AMD 42/12 (6 Şevval 1213/13 March 1799); "Kasr-ı alayı teşrif ve Aya Mavra ceziresinden ahz olunan beş yüz esir İnebahtı tarafından Babıali'ye kayd ü bend ile varid olmağla temaşa ve Topkapu'ya avdet buyuruldu", Arıkan, III. Selim'in Sırkatibi, p. 295. island rather than that of prisoners who reached Istanbul alive. On another occasion, the Ottoman Adriatic leet and Ali Paşa of Janina dispatched 517 French prisoners to Istanbul under the custody of Mehmed Ağa, Ali Paşa's silahdar. hey entered the town of Pravişte with only one casualty and continued their march to Istanbul the next day with a new escort provided by the town.
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Eleven men died before arriving in Keşan in early January 1799 and two more perished on the way to İnecik.
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By late January, 498 of them were present in Silivri (two of them being children) along with ive severed heads. 26 he casualty rate seems to have been around four per cent in this relatively fortunate group of prisoners. Ali Paşa's captives were in a very miserable situation in one sense if we are to believe Pouqueville. hey were forced to cut of the heads of their compatriots who had perished in action and carry them in sacks all the way to Istanbul. According to Pouqueville, these sacks arrived in Istanbul on the same day as the French captives from the garrison of Zante. 27 However, Ali Paşa's report dated October 31, 1798 contradicted Pouqueville's narrative in that he claimed to charge two couriers (tatar) -i.e., not the French captives -with taking 298 heads in total to Istanbul. 28 It is interesting that this igure almost agrees with the number of the civilian Prevesans executed by Ali Paşa upon the fall of the town as cited in various contemporary travelogues. In summary, casualty rates for each group of prisoners during the forced march to Istanbul difered widely. One possible reason for casualties might be the exceptional severity of the winter in 1798-99 in the Balkans, which 24 Pouqueville also observed in his stay in Tripoliçe (Tripolitsa). 31 he singularity of events should warn us against drawing hasty conclusions by relying on illustrative sources such as Pouqueville's. Illustrative as it is, it conveys the revulsion felt at certain Ottoman practices such as the use of severed heads as identity cards. While it is outrageous by our standards, it was by no means a revengeful act of barbarity, as suggested by Pouqueville. It was, rather, a routine bureaucratic task in which the kadı supervised the post-mortem decapitation and entrusted the severed head to an inspector (mübaşir) or courier (tatar) who might or might not travel with the group of captives. his practice was meant to defuse any suspicion in Istanbul of laxity in safeguarding the captives during the march.
Preying on the French
Pouqueville had actually made a promising start from Alexandria. Accompanied by a group of ten French oicers, he left Egypt on a Neapolitan merchant ship bound for France. heir voyage was cut short by the attack of a Tripolitan corsair, Oruç Reis from Dulcigno, of the Calabrian coast on November 25, 1798. Oruç Reis overwhelmed the merchant ship and captured the French oicers. While transferring them to his own ship, Oruç was spotted by a Neapolitan warship. He led at once with some of the prisoners aboard, deserting several of his men who were still aboard the merchant ship with a group of Frenchmen including Pouqueville. hese corsairs, nevertheless, had the wind and the luck on their side and safely led to the open sea.
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According to Pouqueville, Oruç's attack was plainly an act of brigandage since the dey of Tripoli was at peace with France. his assertion implied that their detention 31 He noted that the old people of the town had not remembered such harsh winter conditions in their life, see Pouqueville, Travels hrough the Morea, p. 106.
32 he incident took place on November 26. he group included 11 individuals listed in the following: Pouqueville and Bessieres (members of the Commission of Sciences and Arts of Egypt), Colonel Poitivin (engineer), Colonel Charbonnel (artillery), the Commissary Fornier, Beauvais (commanding adjutant), Gérard (member of the Commission of Sciences and Arts of Egypt), Joie and Bouvier (oicers of the Marines), Guérini (inquisitor of Malta), Mathieu (guide of the general in chief ) (see Pouqueville, p. iv). Prior to the sudden appearance of the Neapolitan warship on the horizon, Oruç Reis had permitted Pouqueville, Fornier, Joie and an aide-de-camp of Bonaparte to return on board the tartane to change clothes in the custody of his own men (Pouqueville, Travels through the Morea, pp. 8-9). Abdülkadir Bey described Oruç Reis as the brother of İzbandud Ali Kapudan, see HAT 79/3302 (29 Cemaziülahir 213/7 December 1798) from Kapudane Abdülkadir Bey to the Porte. was illegal all the same. 33 However, the Sublime Porte had already sent out urgent orders in September 1798 to the deys of Tripoli and Algiers to inform them about the declaration of war on France and encouraged them to chase the French ships. hus, no peace prevailed between the dey of Tripoli and France, regardless of Pouqueville's claims. Oruç surely knew the imperial orders, as suggested by an earlier incident. On October 2, almost two months before this daring incident, another group of French soldiers and merchants numbering 46 in total had left Alexandria for France. hey were captured in the harbour of the island of Saknos (Sofnoz?) upon the timely arrival of the imperial order concerning the Ottoman declaration of war on France and ordering the detention of the French subjects in Ottoman realms. 34 hus, preying on the French subjects in the Levant was the result of a deliberate, albeit inarticulate, oicial policy. his is further illustrated in the case of a certain Salih from Crete who engaged in corsair activity on the orders of the Sublime Porte. When he sold three Frenchmen he had previously captured of Cyprus as slaves, the Porte ordered the commander and kadı of Kandiye to ind these prisoners and send them to the Tersane Dungeon (Imperial Naval Arsenal) under the custody of the inspector to be dispatched from Istanbul. 35 Pouqueville, further, implied that Oruç Reis 'shared' his prisoners with Kapudane Abdülkadir Bey and Ali Paşa of Janina as though they were his private slaves. However, it was the decision of Abdülkadir Bey to detain Gérard and Beauvais -the two highest ranking French oicers -for interrogation. 36 HAT 79/3302 (29 Cemaziülahir 1213/7 December 1798) from Kapudane Abdülkadir Bey to the Porte. He gives the number of the French captives as 11: "derun-ı seinede onbir nefer Fransızlu mevcud olub bir neferi ikinci ceneral ve küsuru oicyal makuleleri olmakdan naşi…ve ceneral-i mesfur ve reiki bir nefer oicyal taraf-ı çakeranemde tevkif birle küsur Fransızları kapudan-ı mezbur Dersaadet'e götüreceği ve ceneral-i mersum berren Der Aliyye'ye be'is ve isra olunacağı…". On December 7, Beauvais and Gérard were sent to İnebahtı via Balyebadre (Patras) on board the frigate Ebu'l-Heves in the custody of Ali Dayı of Tripoli (the ağa of the ship) and his çavuş İbrahim. hey were accompanied by Mehmed Çavuş (Abdülkadir's çavuş) and a tatar.
Mahmud Raif Efendi, the diplomatic commissar in the Ottoman leet, gives the details of this interrogation without mentioning the names of Beauvais and Gérard. Accordingly, Oruç Reis brought them on December 2 to the leet, which then blockaded Corfu. In his interrogation, Beauvais gave a list of his comrades together with him on Oruç's ship 37 and confessed that he had faked illness in order to leave Egypt after losing his conidence in Napoleon. He argued that the expedition was doomed to fail because all the Egyptians hated the French invasion. he Arab tribes cut of the Cairo-Alexandria route, and ongoing guerrilla warfare took a daily toll of 70 soldiers.
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After the interrogation, Abdülkadir Bey sent the two French generals to İnebahtı on board the frigate Ebu'l-Heves. he very fact that Oruç's men, Ali Dayı and İbrahim Çavuş, accompanied the prisoners in the voyage along with Abdülkadir's man Mehmed Çavuş and his messenger (tatar) proves that Oruç was not a freelance bandit who sold his prize to the Ottomans, but was rather recognized as a patented corsair by the Ottomans, who arrested the Frenchmen and delivered them to higher Ottoman authorities in line with the imperial orders.
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Mahmud Raif 's report contradicts Pouqueville explicitly on the matter of Oruç's freedom of action. Oruç Reis was supposed to take all the prisoners except Beauvais and Gérard to Istanbul, as stated in the report.
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But he delivered them to Ali Paşa in the end. According to Pouqueville, this was a further evidence of Oruç's free-lance activities. Nevertheless, it was wintertime and it took 20 days just to reach the Dalmatian coast from Corfu. hus, Oruç's decision to leave them with Ali Paşa stemmed from the contrary winds and storms also witnessed by Pouqueville. hey, then, continued their journey to Istanbul by land.
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As for Pouqueville and his comrades, the corsairs steered the Neapolitan merchant ship to Navarin (Navarino) and delivered the prisoners to local authorities. When they arrived in Tripoliçe, Mustafa Paşa, the governor of the Morea, interrogated them. It is very intriguing that Pouqueville does not mention this interrogation in his memoirs. he summary report of the interrogation, however, suggests that he had every reason to censor this episode in his account. Pouqueville and his friends proved to be very cooperative, providing valuable information on the condition of the French army and navy in Egypt. Morea, hey contended that the Egyptian expedition was full of hardships and that the French oicers were all looking forward to returning to France. hey described Napoleon as a selish individual. Granted full command by his superiors in France, he did not bother consulting with anyone in making decisions in Egypt. His conduct was usually met with disapproval by the rankand-ile, who hated him because of his arrogance and assertiveness.
42

Treatment of the 'prisoners of war'
Pouqueville praised the virtue of the governor of the Morea and the commander of İnebahtı for the smooth organization of the prisoners' journey to Istanbul on several occasions. he reader is left with the impression that the concern for the Frenchmen must have been a personal deed of benevolence, rather than a responsible behaviour of an attentive statesman. Nevertheless, Istanbul decided to keep the French captives in Istanbul and ordered the local authorities to rush them to the capital after taking the necessary measures for their safety. here is strong evidence that indicates that both Mustafa Paşa, the governor of the Morea, and Ahmed Paşa, the commander of İnebahtı, were simply complying with the imperial orders, as will be discussed below.
Pouqueville relates that the Ottoman authorities in Balyebadre (Patras) provided horses for Beauvais and Gérard in the journey to İnebahtı. Ahmed Paşa "behaved very kindly to them, gave them clothes and permitted them to go to the baths…he ordered them to be supplied with boots" 43 before setting out to a 22-day journey to Istanbul. Ahmed Paşa was not particu larly trying to be kind to the Frenchmen but he was meeting Abdülkadir's demand that "the general be delivered to Istanbul safely, conveniently, and rapidly." 44 42 TSMA, E.6699/3 (3 Kanun-ı Evvel): "Mısır'dan 37 gün önce çıkmış bir kıta Alikorna seinesinin beş nefer Fransalu ile Anavarin'e gelüb Fransızlar ihraç ve Trapoliçe'ye nakl ve istintak olunduklarında onbeş nefer Fransalu leylen İskenderiye'den çıkub İtalya sevahiline lede'l-vürud bir Trabluslu korsanına rast gelüb Fransızlar korsan seinesine nakl olunur iken Sicilyateyn kralının bir kıta ceng seinesi zuhur itmeğle korsan gemisi kendü selameti içün müfarekat idüb iş bu beş nefer Fransalu…ve Bonaparta maiyetinde olan sergerdelerin çoğu düçar oldukları enva-ı mesa'iye adem-i tahammüllerinden naşi Fransa canibine avdete hevahişkar olub Bonaparta ceneral hodbinliği muktezası üzere kimesne ile istişare itmeyerek heman kendü reyinde musırr olmağla ve ruhsat-ı kamilesi hasebiyle ammenin reyine mugayir hareketden hali olmamağla cümlesi müteneir olub..." 43 Pouqueville, Travels through the Morea, p. 108. 44 HAT 79/3302 (29 Cemaziülahir 1213/7 December 1798) from Kapudane Abdülkadir Bey to the Porte: "…ol-tarafa lede'l-vusul ceneral-i mersumu emnen ve salimen serian ve acilen Der-aliyye'ye tisyar eylemesi hususu İnebahtı muhafızı Paşa hazretlerine dahi ber-vech-i tafsil tahrir ve iş'ar olunmuş olmağla..."
We can observe the same misinterpretation in Pouqueville's account of the reception of the captured French garrison of Zante by Mustafa Paşa in Tripoliçe. According to Pouqueville, Mustafa Paşa was moved by the sad appearance of the captives and ordered them to be hosted in diferent quarters of his palace -oicers were put in rooms and the rank-and-ile slept along the clean corridors. He even allowed the prisoners to take walks in Tripoliçe by turns. hen he separated the women, children, and the sick from other captives and sent them to Istanbul by vessels he hired. He supplied the remainder with proper shoes and clothes before sending them to Istanbul overland, which took 52 days. And this he did out of compassion according to Pouqueville. he paşa even allowed French prisoners a daily subsistence of 15 para. 45 But, Mustafa Paşa was likely to have acted under the orders of the Porte, as suggested by the above example as well as the reference to the usual Ottoman practice of distributing daily allowances and boots to captives.
he Ottomans used to issue all prisoners with summer and winter uniforms. Among many examples of this Ottoman practice, one may cite the occasion when the Sublime Porte spent 960.5 guruş for the winter clothes for 39 prisoners sent on three ships from Corfu in 1800. he prisoners' winter costume was a red hat (barata), a black coarse woollen cloak (aba), a coarse felt jacket (kebe-i Yanbolu), linen shirt (kirbas-ı ada) and a pair of buckled shoes (kopçalı), each costume worth 25 guruş.
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Figures from the following year show that winter clothes of the prisoners kept at the Tersane cost the Sublime Porte at least 46,741 guruş. Furthermore, the Porte allowed the Spanish embassy to distribute clothes and pocket money among the French prisoners on the mutual understanding that the Ottoman embassy that was kept in house arrest in Paris would be accorded the same treatment.
Most of the French prisoners were kept in the Tersane Dungeon. Although the Imperial Council had initially decided to imprison the French citizens in the French ambassador's residence, Selim revoked the decision, sending commoners to the Tersane Dungeon and prominent Frenchmen to Yedikule.
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Besides the prisoners, many native and foreign engineers and workers, including French subjects, crowded the Tersane besides the prisoners. hey were busy arming and equipping the Ottoman navy against the French in Egypt and the Adriatic. After the arrival of the French prisoners, the Porte had to 45 However, the presence of so many Frenchmen, either as prisoners or employees, was a security risk. An incident that occurred during Ramazan of 1213 (February 6 -March 7, 1799) caused the Ottomans to grow suspicious about the French. An Ottoman three-decker caught ire in the Tersane. One of the non-Muslim carpenters was scapegoated for the accident and severely punished -probably hanged on the spot ("cezası tertib edildiği"). his suspicious accident convinced the Ottomans of the unreliability of the famous French ship-designer Brunne and his staf. he Porte also decided to send some French oicers to fortresses in the provinces until the end of the war. Pouqueville was enraged by this decision because this sapped the French oicers' plot to escape.
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Pouqueville's account of this escape plan sounds unreal to the modern reader. According to the plan, 800 French prisoners were to storm the arms magazine near the Tersane and force their way to "Germany" either over land or in a merchant ship to be seized in the bay. he French oicers hoped that Germans "though at war with France, would have done honour to their valour".
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While Pouqueville's account of the plan sounds totally bombastic and unrealistic, the Ottomans may have gotten wind of such plans before deciding to disperse the oicers to provincial towns. Pouqueville observed that the French oicers became "altogether objects of fear to the Turks" and relevant Ottoman documents described them as seditious (müfsid). 51 48 C.BH 5090 (6 Cemaziülevvel 1214/6 October 1799) and C.BH 3408 (22 Şevval 1214/18 March 1800); a kile is equal to 25.66 kg. for wheat. Making large allowances in her calculation to be on the safe side, Balta concludes that 20 per cent loss in weight occured in making wheat into lour and the bread weighed 30-40 per cent more than the given quantity of the lour, see Balta, Evangelia, "he bread in Greek lands", AÜDTCF Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi, 16/27 (1992-94) , p. 216, especially footnote 73. Following her formula, the monthly bread production of the Tersane with the new wheat ration would rise to 80.059.2 kg. his amount was suicient to feed more than 5,000 individuals a day with a daily allowance of 500 grams each. 
Once locked up in provincial fortresses, each prisoner was allowed a daily subsistence of 5 para, which was to be met from the local resources such as cizye (head tax) and customs revenues. Later -until September 9, 1801 -, this was met from the special fund (Françelü akçesi) created by the coniscated cash from the French subjects. he distribution of 336 prisoners to the fortresses is shown in Table I .
Another list records 112 French subjects with their names, occupations and the places of imprisonment. his was presumably made at an earlier date since it lists Ruin, the French chargé d'afaires, as still kept in Yedikule. He was moved to the embassy with his retinue of four after Pouqueville's group came to Yedikule in the summer of 1799. 
Transportation of French prisoners back to Istanbul
he Sublime Porte ran into many diiculties concerning the treatment of the prisoners in the provincial towns. Several incidents suggest that the boundaries between the esir-i miri/harb esiri and gulam are quite blurred at this time. Complaints about hidden captives in private hands were never absent.
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A major diiculty was the unwelcome intervention of the local notables in certain towns. One of the notables of Amasra, for instance, demanded from the fortress commander to deliver Le-do, a 16-year-old French prisoner, to him. His threats of storming the fortress caused much panic among the fortress guards as well as the prisoners. he Danish chargé d'afaires Baron Hubsch, who represented the prisoners before the Sublime Porte, pointed out this was contrary to the law of nations, not to mention proper moral manners. He requested the Porte to transfer Le-do to the French palace in Istanbul. It is very telling that the notable is quoted as calling this prisoner "gulam." his shows that the distinction between a war captive and a prisoner of war was not so clear in the minds of at least some Ottomans. he Porte ordered the local authorities to protect the prisoner from the notable and to investigate whether Le-do had converted to Islam, which the notable might use as a pretext to lay his hands on him. hose captives who claimed to have converted to Islam were to be interrogated before the kadı in the presence of a French representative. It is worth mentioning that absence of a clause concerning compensation for French slaves was a new departure from the pattern set by the preceding Russo-Ottoman treaties. Even before the signing of the treaty, the Sublime Porte had released captives in central state custody, numbering roughly 900 men, women and children. here were only 35 captives left in the Tersane Dungeon by May 1802.
63
Most of these captives had to be transported back to Istanbul from provincial fortresses. During the peace negotiations carried out with General Menou, the Sublime Porte transferred some of the high-ranking French oicers and civilian prisoners in and outside Istanbul to the French embassy through the mediation of Baron Hubsch.
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Among this group were 33 prisoners kept in Sinop, Samsun and Giresun and they were all civilians: consular staf.
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A commission under the presidency of Ruin was set up in order to facilitate the process. Ruin informed the Porte that 12 of the 20 prisoners in Tokat were actually seized by certain individuals. he Porte, thus, ordered the local authorities to send them along with an inspector (mübaşir) so that they could be interrogated by the kadı with a dragoman present in the session.
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Almost a year later, the matter was still unresolved. Mehmed, a çukadar of the grand vezir, was then sent to investigate the matter. he investigation yielded interesting results. We learn from Mehmed's report that one of the prisoners had tasallutu men eylemek içün iktiza eden zabitana emr…" On the common practice of conversion by the captives see Smiley, Will, "he meanings of conversion: treaty law, state knowledge, and religious identity among Russian captives in the eighteenth-century Ottoman empire", he International History Review, 34/3 (2012) (forthcoming).
62 "…hin-i muharebede ahz olunub Memalik-i Mahrusemde bulunan Françelü üserasının sebilleri bila-bedel tahliye olunması bu defa akdolunan musalaha ahitnamesinin sekizinci maddesinde musarrah olduğuna binaen..." HAT 1194/56910 retains the drafts proposed by Talleyrand and Galib Efendi as well as the original treaty. A detailed analysis of this document would be highly interesting in order to show the priorities of the two sides; Also see, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tarih converted to Islam and married the year before the investigation as he professed to the kadı. A group of ive prisoners were delivered to Mehmed. As for the remaining six prisoners, the situation proved to be complicated since separate investigations by Mehmed and Ruin turned out that they had been seized by the strongmen of Tokat. Four months before the investigation, one of them, Fevtlioğlu Hacı Muhammed, had bartered a French prisoner (Manzen) in exchange for a donkey; the other, al-Haj Ali, had sold Jozef in Zile (in the vicinity of Tokat). Another prisoner was in the possession of Alemdar Abdurrahman during the time of investigation. Genç Mehmed Ağa, however, detained this man together with Jan, Asye and Jozef in his harem quarters by force in order to hide them from the inspector. Mehmed, the inspector, described these last four prisoners as remaining "with their 'possessor' Genç Mehmed Ağa." According to the conventional view, the paşa had double-dealings with the French and the Ottomans. When the French declined to give Santa Maura to him, he turned against them and sided with the Ottomans. Rose was the French representative at the court of Ali. he paşa liked him so much so that he had arranged his marriage with a Greek girl. However, this cynical paşa needed an opportunity to latter the Porte and defuse all suspicions about his loyalty after he failed to cut a deal with the French. He staged the muchdesired occasion by summoning Rose to his court. After giving him a warm reception as usual, he informed him about the Ottoman declaration of war on France and put him under arrest in the sneakiest way. hen, he sent him along with General Lasalcette to Istanbul, in irons.
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When Rose arrived in Istanbul, however, he was interrogated and told quite a diferent story. His testimony clearly shows that he had known about the outbreak of the war with France prior to the last meeting with Ali Paşa. His family had been serving as consuls of France at Balyebadra for 80 years. Knowing Greek and living in the Morea, he had married a Greek girl in Janina with the permission of Ali Paşa seven months prior to his detention. he last time he met Ali Paşa was 12 days before latter's attack on Prevesa. In the meeting, he continued, they had exchanged news and views about the French expedition to Egypt. Accordingly, when the Porte had decided to arrest French consuls and to coniscate French goods, the French administration in Prevesa retaliated by detaining some Ottoman ships in the harbour of Prevesa, including the one belonging to Ali Paşa. Rose concluded that this was the reason for his detention in Janina. It is worth mentioning that Rose uses very cordial language about Ali Paşa, while criticizing Napoleon and the French directors in harsh language, for violating peaceful relations with the Sublime Porte. Obviously, one should treat his cordiality with caution as his statements were iltered by his Ottoman interrogators and summarized in the oicial report. Both Rose and Lacalsette provided valuable information about the French military preparations in Corfu, which shows their inclination to cooperate with the Ottoman authorities against the French war efort in the Levant.
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Conclusion
All the French prisoners were inally released and sent back to France by the autumn of 1802. Pouqueville left Istanbul in the company of a mixed group on 9 September 1802 aboard St. Stephen.
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He left Istanbul with mixed feelings and conlicting memories about his period of captivity.
Our soldiers were in the end treated far better than the other prisoners…though barbarians, they [the Turks] knew how to respect misfortune. hey not only separated them from the slaves, but they did not fatigue them by excessive labour… 69 TSMA, E.6699/4 report of interrogation of Rose and Lacalsette: "…Roz Şabo'nun maiyetinde olub ecdadı 80 seneden beru bi't-tevarüs Balyebadre'de Fransa konsolosları olduklarından kendüsü dahi Mora'da ikameti hasebiyle Rum lisanını taallüm ve ahz olunmazdan 7 ay önce Ali Paşa'nın izni lahık olarak Yanya'da bir Rum kızı ile teehhül idüb Preveze vakıasından 12 gün önce bazı ahvali müzakere itmek suretiyle…Memalik-i Mahruse'de Fransa konsolosları tevkif ve tüc-car emvali zabt olunduğu mesmu oldukda Preveze'de kain Ali Paşa'nın 1 kıta seinesi ve bazı sefayin-i saire dahi Fransalu'dan zabt olunmağla bu sefayin mukabelesinde kendüsünün tevkii lazım geldiği Paşanın silahdarı vesatatıyla ihbar birle derakap Yanya tarafına irsal eylediğini… Devlet-i Aliye ve Fransa devleti ve cumhuru beyninde kadimü'l-eyyamdan beru musafat-ı kamile derkar ve taraf-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeden icra-yı merasim-i mevalata daima riayet olunarak nakz-i ahdi icab ider bir gune halet zuhur itmediği celi ve aşikar iken Fransa müdirleri yüzünden böyle oldu. Fransa milleti yalnız bu müdirlerin deine kıyam ile müttehim olduğunu lede'l-irad bu kazayayı teslim birle müdirlerini şütum-ı galize ile yad…ve anlara lanet okumağa ibtidar…" 70 Two other ships carrying the prisoners left Istanbul respectively, on September 15 and October 1, 1802, see Pouqueville, Travels through the Morea, pp. 169-70; C.HRC 667 (n.d.) must refer to one of the last two groups of prisoners. It states that a group of 65 men, 8 women, 10 children and 2 servants were sent to France by a Russian merchant vessel (San Nikolo).
he captains of Turkish ships instead of ill-treating them, often made them a compensation. 71 Apparently, post-mortem decapitation of the French prisoners and the Ottoman disregard of military hierarchy in their treatment at certain times were shocking for Pouqueville. Furthermore, particular cases we have focused on suggest that categories of captivity and slavery had not yet separated from each other in the minds of many. Nevertheless, Ottoman oicial policy in the treatment of prisoners was based on the concept of reciprocity as suggested by recent studies on the subject. 72 Obviously, we need more studies to highlight Ottoman treatment of war prisoners, bringing together the illustrative evidence from narrative sources and hardcore evidence from the documents. his has the potential of not only reaching a comprehensive understanding of the subject but also drawing general conclusions about wider issues of the evolution of Ottoman juridico-political culture in the early modern era. 71 Pouqueville, Travels through the Morea, [139] [140] Consult in this volume Smiley, Will "Let whose people go? Liberation, legalism, sovereignty, and subjecthood in eighteenth-century Russo-Ottoman relations". [they] surrendered in the year 1798, to the combined Turkish and Russian armies. According to the terms which they obtained, they were to be sent to a place occupied by the French armies in Italy: but the Russian commander, who ought to have protected the people of a civilized nation against the Turks, oppressed them in their misfortune, and landed them at Castel-Tornese, to be conveyed to the dungeons of Constantinople. No pen can describe the rage of these men, on inding they were cast on the Turkish territory: they regretted that they had not sufered themselves to be buried under the ruins of Zante; and in short, they conceived the frantic thought of forcing their way through the Turkish territory into Germany: but they had no arms, nor the means of procuring any; they were therefore obliged to submit to the humiliating chains of Constantinople." p. 40 = (the garrison of Zante's forced march to Tripoliçe): "On leaving Pyrgo, they were compelled to pass the river Alpheus, chained together like criminals: sometimes the water reached up to their shoulders and many were in consequence drowned.
APPENDIX I
p. 24 = (on the 2 'naked, meager and diseased' French soldiers of the 6 th demi-brigade): "they belonged to the garrison of Zante, who were on their way to Constantinople; but twelve of them were left sick at Tripolitza, of whom themselves alone had the misfortune to survive. hey informed us of the way which the Pacha allowed for their subsistence; and of which our Greek, who was their intendant, had robbed them of two-thirds. As the same knavery had been displayed towards us (the Pacha having allowed us ifteen parats, equal to about thirteen sous daily, for our board), I resolved to question Constantine, and reprimand him on the subject." p. 138 = (the garrison of Zante): After a forced march of ifty-two days, the remains of the brave garrison of Zante entered Constantinople…he pacha of Albania [Tepedelenli Ali Paşa] had just sent to Constantinople, the heads of the Frenchmen who were found dead on the ield of battle at Prevesa, and they were exposed at the gate of the seraglio as the monuments of a splendid victory…they made them ile of before the heads of their late companions: but with such sights they were familiar; they had themselves been obliged to bring these horrible remains, and were treated by their guards as outcasts of the human race. hey even obliged them to cut of the heads of their brothers in arms; and any one who might have refused to perform this revolting operation, would have been instantly butchered.
II
p. v = In short, I was reduced to slavery by a Tripoline corsair… p. 3 = he corsair soon discharged a few shot at us; and continued to ire, as he advanced, while we were unable to make any resistance from a want of arms. he shouts of the enemy's cre, the noise of his cannon, and the clashing sabres, redoubled as he approached. We had hoisted our lag; and did nothing but make signals of peace, till the enemy ran foul of our vessel and boarded. he audacity of these banditti was at its height on perceiving there was not a single armed man on board, but each of us was in an abject and peaceable attitude. hey instantly knocked us down, and beat several of us in most cruel manner. p. 9 = As the Reis [the lieutenant of Oruç Reis] did not know that we were at war with the Ototman Porte, we gave him to understand, that since he could take us where he pleased, it would be more to his interest to land us at the isle of Zante than t Tripoli, as we could not now be at any great distance from the former. We added that on his arriva, he would be generously rewarded by the French commanders… III p. 103 = "hey now began to provide us with lodging; and a few planks placed upon two tressels, with a miserable mattrass, formed our temporary bed, on which we lay without undressing…[the kahya Sadık Aga] put us the next day in a room which was occupied by the domestics of the charge d'afaires, who had been turned out for our accommodation….[other French prisoners] mentioned to us several of our countrymen who had preceded us in the Seven Towers, and who, from an inveterate hatred towards the French had been sent by the government to the fortresses on the Black Sea. We thus learnt the names of several highly respectable persons who had been tyrannically sent to distant prisons by the fanatical Turks." 4 p. 40 = … [When Mustafa Pasha, the governor of the Morea] saw the unfortunate Frenchmen chained together in pairs, he could scarcely restrain his indignation: he gave immediate orders that every respect should be paid to them, and they were all lodged in his palace; the women separately, the oicers in rooms, and the soldiers in a clean and wholesome corridor. Provisions were regularly distributed amongst them, and they allowed a certain time to rest, before the proceeded on their extensive journey. One half of the soldiers had permission to walk daily about the town and its environs, under the command of their oicers; and when they were at length obliged to set of for Constantinople, the pacha hired several vessels at Naupli in Romania, to convey the women, children, and convalescents. he pacha in short, did every thing to ameliorate the situation of these Frenchmen; and before they set of, he ordered them to be supplied with good shoes." p. 108 = [Gerard and Beauvais are taken to Balyebadra by the pirates. he Ottoman authorities in Patras provided horses for their journey to Lepanto]: "Here they were presented to the pacha Achmet, who afterwards became pacha of the Morea: he behaved very kind to them, gave them clothes and permitted them to go to the baths. As it was December, he ordered them to be supplied with boots, that they might travel the more commodiously to Constantinople." p. 109 = [in Salona]: "M. Beauvais, who was quite overcome with fatigue was seized with a violent fever, the symptoms of which increased to such a degree, that the pirates came to the resolution of cutting of his head, if he did not get well enough to continue his journey on the following day. Happily, Ali Tchiaoux [Çavuş], though a barbarian, favoured his recovery, by covering him with his cloak." p. 110 = [In Larissa]: "[the Ottoman general] sent them to sleep in the khan, which is the ordinary residence of travellers, so that this time they were not treated like slaves; indeed they always observed that the great men in the empire acted towards them in a generous manner." 3 p. 41 = (Upon reaching Istanbul): "the oicers were disarmed, and all, without distinction, were sent into the bagne, or common prison; where, during three years, such of the victims as survived their misery, were conined in chains, and subjected to the most horrid treatment." p. 138 = (the garrison of Zante) On arriving at the Bagne, the oicers were stripped of their arms, the prisoners were counted, and they were all shut up together. hey were soon loaded with chains, the soldiers fettered in pairs, while the oicers had an iron ring ixed on their leg as a mark of distinction." pp. 139-140 = "Our soldiers were in the end treated far better than the other prisoners. he Turks no longer confounded them together; and though barbarians, they knew how to respect misfortune they not only separated them from the slaves, but they did not fatigue them by excessive labour. Between six and seven in the morning, they called them over and sent them to work; they labored in the port, in rigging and equipping ships; and those who were too weak, remained in the court of the Bagne, where they were employed in beating junk into oakum. Towards noon they had a meal, and at four in the afternoon, their day was inished. he captains of the Turkish ships instead of ill-treating them, often made them a compensation. At six o'clock the guards again mustered the prisoners, who were afterwards shut up in their cells." p. 141 = "Such was the prison in which for nearly four years, Frenchmen of all classes were conined, who in 1799 amounted to 1200 in number, and a great part of whom
